In this paper, we develop a framework for evaluating the impact of conservative accounting on the structure of residual income models of equity valuation. We explore specific examples of both unconditional and conditional conservatism and observe a common mathematical structure. We proceed to generalise our model and identify the joint dependency of conservatism and the persistence of abnormal earnings on the weights attached to book values, earnings and dividends.
Introduction
The principle of accounting conservatism remains a pervasive guiding constraint in the recognition of asset values and income. Conservatism involves an asymmetric treatment of gains and losses Ohlson (1995, 1996) , Ohlson (1995) , Basu (1997) , Beaver and Ryan (2005) ). It manifests itself in a behavior that understates equity book value or requires "a stronger verifiability requirement for the recognition of gains than for the recognition of losses" (Watts (2003) ). In its implementation, conservatism drives a wedge between reported equity values and market values. An early stream of empirical literature (Amir and Lev (1996) , Penman (1996 Penman ( , 1998 , Barth et al. (1998) , Collins et al. (1999) , Francis and Schipper (1999) ) have investigated the link between market prices, book values, earnings and dividends. However, this research has met with mixed success. Regression tests exploring this link frequently produce coefficients that have been difficult to interpret as regards both their sign and magnitude.
In this paper, we are primarily concerned with the impact of both conditional and unconditional conservatism on residual income models of equity valuation and information dynamics of abnormal earnings. We start by considering specific examples of accounting policies on the weights attached to book value and earnings in residual income models. We identify such a structure whereby these weights are mathematical functions of both conservatism and the persistence of abnormal earnings and where the same structure is equally applicable to conditional and unconditional conservatism. The paper by Ashton and Wang (2013) explores this same issue but concentrates on the empirical implications of conservatism. They adopt a 'top-down' approach to modelling conservatism and show how earnings conservatism leads to balance sheet conservatism. In contrast our approach can be best described as 'bottom-up'. We start by considering specific example of balance sheet conservatism and earnings conservatism before generalising the model and showing how the two are inextricably linked. Our emphasis throughout is on the theoretical modelling and understanding the nature of conservatism. Our work also differs strongly from most other prior studies such as Zhang (2000), and Beaver and Ryan (2005) . In contrast, when Zhang (2000) examines the impact of conservatism on valuation weights on book values and (capitalised) earnings, he assumes the weights constant and independent of conservatism, whereas we model the dependency of the weights on both the persistence of abnormal earning and the degree of conservatism. Indeed, we argue that from the point of view of equity valuation models the distinction between conditional and unconditional conservatism in Beaver and Ryan (2005) is largely irrelevant, 1 and that the manifestations of the two forms are inextricably linked.
Our starting point is the residual income valuation model of Ohlson (1995) in which he derives an equity valuation model based on the assumption that abnormal earnings, defined as earnings less a capital charge, are eroded over time, giving rise to the concept of unbiased accounting in which book
and market values of equity converge. The difficulty with the conceptual unbiased accounting system posited by Ohlson (1995) is that it is not observable. The task in this paper is to establish the relationship between this unbiased and unobservable system and a reported system, where accounting values are possibly biased, inter alia, by conservative reporting principles. We begin by considering specific examples of unconditional and conditional conservatism. We consider the effect of different depreciation policies and the impact of historical cost accounting under inflationary conditions as examples of the former and the speed of recognition of "good" news and "bad" news, together with income smoothing as examples of the latter. Using a series of stochastic difference equations, we develop parametric relationships between a reported and observable, though possibly biased by conservatism, accounting information system and the corresponding unbiased unobservable accounting system of Ohlson (1995) . We generalise our analysis to show how a common underlying mathematical structure unites these two forms of conservatism and we identify a single common 1 This does not undermine the use of the classification of conservatism in Beaver and Ryan (2005) as a conceptual framework for discussing accounting policy or the empirical classification for event studies such as carried out by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Basu (1997) .
summary measure of the degree of conservatism. Consistent with intuition, we predict that the price-to-earnings ratio, the price-to-book ratio and the return on equity are all monotonically increasing functions of this summary measure. We investigate empirically the dependency of valuation weights of book value and earnings on conservatism using US data over the period 1976-2010 and find that they accord well with the theory developed.
Our theoretical analysis also provides insights into apparently anomalous observations emerging in empirical research, such as the persistent undervaluation of market values by residual income models (Dechow et al. (1999) , Myers (1999) ) and the failure to detect conservatism in the linear information dynamics. Current theory suggests that conservatism should attribute a positive coefficient to lagged book value, when added to the simple autoregressive structure of residual income dynamics (Feltham and Ohlson (1995) , Myers (1999) ). In contrast, almost all empirical work documents a negative conservative parameter in such abnormal earnings regressions (Dechow et al. (1999) , Myers (1999) , Ahmed, et al. (2000) , Beaver and Ryan (2000) , Choi et al. (2006) ). We argue that the structural form of the linear dynamics under conservatism is likely to produce misleading results under the econometric methods hitherto used.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we flesh out the detail of how conservatism modifies the structure of the Ohlson (1995) equity valuation model by considering specific examples of unconditional and conditional conservatism. This analysis leads to the observation of a common mathematical structure unifying our examples of conditional and unconditional conservatism. In Section 3, we develop a general theory of conservatism together with a simple measure of conservatism. We relate this measure of conservatism to accounting fundamentals and the price-to-book ratio, and use the insights gained from our analytical structure to explain apparent anomalies and difficulties encountered in prior empirical literature. Section 4 provides the empirical evidence to support our theoretical modeling. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Examples of Conditional and Unconditional Conservatism
In this section, we employ the methodology of stochastic difference equations to establish the links between accounting variables and valuation functions in an unbiased system and the corresponding links between accounting variables and valuation functions in a reporting system, which is subject to the principle of conservatism. We first use specific examples to provide concrete contexts and specificity, and then demonstrate the existence of a common underlying mathematical structure encompassing these examples in the following section. We start with a review of the Ohlson (1995) framework and the concept of unbiased accounting.
Equity Valuation and Information Dynamics in the Ohlson (1995) Framework
Ohlson ( (2):
(1 ) ( 1) .
2 We do not consider an "other information" variable here. Accounting conservatism is a long-run property and "other information" in the standard residual income based valuation model is generally regarded as behaving as a stationary auto-regressive process, and therefore it is not expected to be critical to valuation in the long-run.
t d
The valuation weights are purely functions of the cost of equity capital and the persistence of abnormal earnings. However, the accounting information system in Ohlson (1995) is unbiased in the sense that the expected future values of book and market equity converge. The unbiased book value of equity, t b′ , may differ from the equity price at time t because the book value does not take account of expected future abnormal earnings. These abnormal earnings are assumed to be eroded over time by competition (Fisher and McGowan (1983) ). As a result, the above information dynamics, equation (1) and the valuation model (2) are not directly testable, unless we are prepared to accept that reported accounting numbers are an adequate representation of economic rents. Thus our immediate task is to investigate how Ohlson's (1995) hypothesised unbiased accounting system is transformed under conservative reporting principles to an accounting system that is observable. In this reporting system, the accounting will be likely biased in the sense that the expected values of long-run book and market values no longer converge.
Purely for tractability of our analysis, we initially assume that our firms are all-equity financed 3 ; an assumption that we will relax when we generalise our model in Section 3. We denote the hypothesised unbiased information system by t 
I
represents the total investment including investments in both tangible and intangible assets at time t.
With this notation, we turn our attention to how unbiased accounting might be modified by a 3 Alternatively we could interpret this part of our analysis as comparing two identical firms save for differences in accounting policies, with references to cash flows referring to only the equity portion of these.
reporting system subject to the principles of conservatism. Feltham and Ohlson (1996) Specifically, we assume the following relationships hold:
Unconditional Conservative Systems
.
Here 0 ' and 1. α α ≤ < For parsimony of the analysis, we also assume t I which represents the equity portion of investment follows a stochastic growth path:
where g ≥ 0 represents long-run average growth and is a random error term with expectation zero and assumed to be serially independent. 5 The equations as specified in (3) and (4) are thus stochastic difference equations. It follows that the long-run equilibrium relationship is shown as in equation (5), where proofs of equation (5) and the following three equations (6)-(8) can be found in Appendix A.
The expected long-run equilibrium values of the unbiased book values in terms of the corresponding 4 This structure is more general than it may appear at first sight. We can regard α as an average or composite rate of depreciation over different classes of assets, both tangible and intangible. For example α may include a contribution from the expensing of intangibles investments such as R&D or advertising. Note that (1 ) α − here is equivalent to δ (a policy parameter which determines the depreciation rate) in Feltham and Ohlson (1996 pp215) . They state that 'the overdepreciation case δ γ ≤ (the cash receipts persistence parameter) is of interest because it induces conservative accounting.' In our analysis, we do not assume the cash inflow dynamics. Therefore we do not have parameter, γ . Instead, we directly assume two policy parameters, α and α ′ in both biased and unbiased accounting systems. 5 Value is determined purely by investment policy and the model is thus consistent with dividend displacement (Miller and Modigliani (1961) ). We also assume, as do most residual income models that risk is held constant. [ | ] 1 . 
Note that CSR implies the cash identity: t t t Y I d = + . Equation (5) shows that whenever the reported accounting depreciation rate (α ) is greater than the economic depreciation rate (α ′ ) accounting is conservative: the reported book value understates unbiased book values (or balance sheet conservatism). From equation (6), we see that the reported earnings are also understated relative to unbiased economic earnings whenever accounting is conservative (or earnings conservatism). By direct substitution in to equation (2), together with CSR, the expected value of equity given the reported financial information set t Λ , [ | ] t t E V Λ , can be written as:
(1 ) ( 1) [ | ] (1 )
If we let U g α α χ α ′ − = ′ + , equation (7) can be written more succinctly as:
( 1) (1 ) [ | ] (1 )
The parameter U χ is a convenient summary measure of the application of this unconditional conservative policy. It is a monotonic increasing function of ( ) In contrast to the valuation model in equation (2), in the modified valuation model the weights on book value, earnings and dividends in equation (8) (8) shows that as our summary measure of conservatism U χ increases, the weights attached to book value and earnings increase. In contrast, our model predicts that the weight attached to dividends (net of new capital contributions) is negative and decreases with increasing conservatism.
We can extend the above analysis to cover the case of historical cost accounting under inflation, which is also a form of unconditional conservatism. In the case of historical cost accounting under inflation, in addition to any possible effects of accelerated depreciation, the recognition of earnings is delayed because accounting earnings ignores the contribution from the appreciation of assets. We assume that reported earnings and book values satisfy the same equations as before, i.e. (1 )(1 )
1 1
(1 ) ,
Here η is the rate of inflation and is a random error term which has expectation zero and is assumed serially independent. Investment has a real growth rate g in addition to any inflationary (
We note that the mathematical structure of the relationship between inflation adjusted values and reported values is identical to that in equations (5) and (6), with a summary measure of the conservatism given by
It is clear that U χ increases in the rate of inflation, η. This analysis generalises earlier results found in Hughes et al. (2004) and Ashton et al. (2011) . 
Conditional Conservative Systems
Depreciation and historical cost accounting under inflation are essentially examples of unconditional conservatism or balance sheet conservatism. We now provide an example of conditional accounting conservatism to show how a common underlying mathematical structure unites these two forms of conservatism within a residual income framework.
Conservatism also arises where the firm is cautious in the recognition of "good" news in the form of an unexpected, possibly uncertain, increases in income but speedy recognizes "bad" news in the form of an unexpected, or uncertain decrease, in income. An implication 7 of this is that earnings are more positively related to current equity share returns when earnings are negative than when earnings are positive (Basu (1997) , Pope and Walker (1999) We suppose that an unbiased accounting system records a set of earnings t e′ according to
6 Hughes et al. (2004) examine the value relevance of accounting variables and characterise the impact of inflation on the weights that attach to the accounting items. They are primarily concerned with the question as to whether one can adjust depreciation policy in an inflationary environment to produce an unbiased valuation model. Ashton et al. (2011) examine a special case where α α′ = and g=0.
7 It may lead to an improved contracting, decreased litigation risk and reduced information asymmetry (Watts (2003) ).
where t e ɶ is the "unambiguous" portion of uncertain earnings at time t and 0 t ε > represents "good" news or an unanticipated increase in income and 0 t ε < represents "bad" news or an unanticipated shortfall in income. For the convenience of our modelling, we let
, where ε is an independent and identically distributed random variable with mean zero 8 . In our conservative accounting system, we suppose that earnings t e can be written as
where the adjustment t Φ is used to recognise the cumulative past and current impact of good or bad news that has been incorporated in the current earnings. For our convenience, we assume
Thus only a fraction λ ( λ′ ) of good news (bad news) is incorporated at any time t. Under conservative accounting, the impact of any good news is recognised over a relatively long time period 
Given (15), t e are related to t e′ by the following relationship:
In order to summarise the history of the incorporation of news and derive a closed form solution we again make the simplifying assumption that the expected changes in book values occur at a growth rate of g. Given the clean surplus relationship, it follows (see Appendix A for details) from equation (17) that the transformation from the unbiased system to the reported accounting system can be written:
8 While lagged book value may capture the size effect of a firm in (17) below in fact describes the stochastic nature of return on equity. 
The resulting valuation equation is:
) .
We note that the mathematical structure of the equations in (18), (19) and (20) assumes the same pattern as in the previous subsection with the summary measure representing, in this case, conditional conservatism taking the form: (20) can be rewritten as:
In this case, the policy giving rise to conservatism is attributable to the relative speeds in the recognition of future negative and positive earnings. Given the "uncertainty" of the ambiguous portion of return on equity, the degree of conservatism depends on the "speed" with which this ambiguous portion of earnings is incorporated into reported earnings and the volatility or the arrival 9 In the case of ε being distributed as a zero mean normal with standard deviation σ ,
rate of news. Since C χ can be written as
, we observe that the degree of accounting conservatism increases as ( )
The policy of smoothing a growing income stream also delays the recognition of future positive earnings and is a form of conservatism. The mathematical analysis is developed in Appendix B and again the degree of conservatism can be summarised by a simple χ -parameter.
A Theoretical Model of Conservatism

Integrating Conditional and Unconditional Conservatism
Although our examples of conditional and unconditional conservatism result in an apparently common mathematical structure for the valuation function, equations (8) and (21), it remains unclear how the different forms of conservatism that might be simultaneously practiced by an individual firm might manifest themselves. We also note that in their present forms our valuation functions are not directly testable. Economic depreciation rates (α ′ ) and the speed of recognition of good or bad news ( λ or λ′ ) are not observable. Apart from these accounting policy parameters, our measures of conservatism are also functions of some assumed long-term growth rates in investment and book values, which summarise the impact of the past history of the consistent application of conservative accounting policies.
If we reflect on the underlying structure of our conditional and unconditional conservatism, we see that they essentially have the same impact on earnings and book values. In the case of earnings conservatism, as in equation (18), the adjustment to reported earnings takes the form:
Equation (22) together with the clean surplus relationship and the invariance of dividends in the two systems imply:
from which it follows that:
or [ | ] (1 ) ,
which characterises balance sheet conservatism. On the other hand, we have from our equation for balance sheet conservatism that:
[ | ] (1 )
and hence that: We also have a number of interesting observations. First, a weighted average of equations (8) and (21) gives (1 ) ( 1) [ | ] (1 ) (1 ) , natural weighting 10 and are inextricably connected. We also note in this context that in equation (14) the measure of conservatism is just the sum of the measure for accelerated depreciation and the measure for inflation applied independently to the same asset.
Second, equation (28) can be written in the form
( 1) [ | ] (1 )
, emphasising the intractability of separating balance sheet conservatism from earnings conservatism. This is also consistent with Pope and Walker (1999) who argue that balance sheet conservatism reduces the measures of earnings conservatism in valuation.
Third, equation (29) can be also written in the following form:
We see that the former expression is equal to the original Ohlson model (equation (2)) plus an additional term that controls for the influence of conservatism on the expected economic value of equity. In other words, the expected value of equity can be divided into two parts: the value in the absence of conservatism ( the first three terms) and the value of accounting conservatism, represented by the final term.
11
We now turn our attention to identifying the structure of the linear information dynamics that is consistent with our revised valuation model. Prior empirical research reports a failure to detect conservatism in the structure of the linear information dynamics. In this research, investigators invariably use a model as in equation (31) 
In our review of the published literature, we find that all such empirical work documents a negative value attached to the book value term (Dechow et al. (1999) , Myers (1999) , Ahmed, et al. (2000) , Beaver and Ryan (2000) , Choi et al. (2006) ).
The linear dynamics consistent with valuation equation (28) [ ]
where 1 ω ω = . A proof can be found in appendix A. We note that this last equation can also be derived directly by application of the book value and earnings transformations equations, (22) and (24), to the simple autoregressive process for abnormal earnings in the unbiased system, equation (1) , confirming consistency between the valuation structure and the linear information dynamics. We note that the structure of equation (32), with a t+1 variable on the right-hand side does not easily lend itself to simple econometric methods 12 .
Our summary measure of conservatism χ refects how the conservatism that manifests itself in the accounting statements depends on the different accounting policies pursued and the past histories of the application of these policies. We have captured this past history by the simplifying assumption of a long-run growth rate (g) and by simple but unobservable parameters specifying different accounting policies. Next, we provide a more useful way of specifying summary measure of conservatism χ .
12 Ashton and Wang (2013) get round this issue by using a variant of Lintner's (1964) dividend smoothing model to forecast 1
A Measure of Conservatism
In an unbiased system, we have the expected convergence of market and book values, 
Both Ohlson and Gao (2006) and Rajan et al. (2007) derive results similar to those above, albeit from slightly different perspectives. Although their approach is somewhat different from ours, both approaches imply the return on equity is negatively related to growth under a conservative accounting policy. Ohlson and Gao (2006) argue that conservative accounting increases the market-to-book ratio with an offsetting increased expected return on equity. Our expression of ROE in equation (35) shows that the difference between the return on equity and the cost of capital is positively related to the degree of conservatism given a moderate growth rate. It summarizes the main results in Rajan et al. (2007) , who argue that ROE is 'a function of two variables: past growth in new investments and accounting conservatism…more conservative accounting will increase ROE provided growth in new investment has been moderate'.
We now turn our attention to explaining and interpreting a puzzle that has arisen in the empirical investigation of residual income models. We observe the almost universal undervaluation in applications of such models (Dechow et al. (1999) , Myers (1999) , Choi et al. (2006) ). The undervaluation follows a "naive" application of the Ohlson (1995) residual income model to the valuation of equity when accounting is conservative, using as an estimate for price t P the valuation
, where ω is the persistence of residual income.
14 The majority of studies use the reported book equity and residual income as appropriate proxies for the corresponding unbiased values to compute this valuation function and estimate the persistence parameter ω using an autoregressive model of residual earnings. The use of this valuation equation generates the following expression for the ratio of intrinsic residual income valuation to market price: 
If we assume 0.6 ω = as evidenced in prior literature, and assume plausible parameters R = 1.12 and g = 6% (Dechow et al. (1999) , Gregory et al. (2005) ), we find that, when book value is two-thirds of market value, corresponding to 0.5 χ = , the undervaluation is 32%. We also note that most of this undervaluation comes from the relatively low value of book-to-market value. The contribution from the present value of (positive) residual income makes only a small difference, roughly 1%; failing to bridge the gap between book and market values of equity. Even at low degrees of conservatism ( 0.1 χ = ), there is a significant undervaluation of 10% in residual income valuations.
In this case, we estimate that book value is 90% of the market value and that the residual income reduces the shortfall by less than one percentage point. We illustrate the impact of conservatism on the undervaluation in simple residual income models, the return on equity and the price-earnings ratio in Figure 1 . The closeness of the curves labeled 'Book to Market' and 'Valuation to Market' in Figure   1 reinforces the minimal impact of the discounted value of residual income.
<Insert Figure 1 about here> Consideration of Figure 1 illustrates the expected result that the price-earnings ratio and the return on equity are inversely related to book-to-market via accounting conservatism. The graph covers the range of values from that of a book value that is twice the market value, corresponding to aggressive accounting with 0.5 χ = − , to a book value that is just one third of market value corresponding to conservative accounting with 2.0 χ = . The price earnings ratio increases from 5 to 13 when χ increases from -0.5 to 2.0. The corresponding increase in the return on equity is from a value of 9% when 0.5 χ = − to a value of 24% when 2.0 χ = . The 'unbiased' PE ratio is 8.8 with a corresponding unbiased return on equity equal to the cost of capital of 12%.
The Supporting Evidence
We . 15 All variables used in our estimation are divided by the adjusted number of shares in issue to reduce heteroscedasticity and increase comparability across time. The price-to-book ratio is measured by the market value of equity and the book value of equity at the end of the year. Observations with a price per share less than $1 are deleted. When we estimate abnormal earnings, we assume a constant cost of capital of 12% in its computation. 16 We provide summary statistics in Table 1 .
< Insert Table 1 about here>
Panel A of Table 1 shows that the average price-to-book ratio is about 2.14 and the median is about 1.51 in our sample period. The mean and median of forward earnings yield are 4.8% and 6.1%
respectively. The mean and median of return on equity are 7.8% and 10.6% respectively.
Since valuation weights are not only functions of conservatism measure, χ , but are also associated with the persistence of abnormal earnings, ω , we examine the relation between valuation weights and conservatism based on 25 portfolios, which are formed on five χ quintiles and five ω quintiles.
In our modified valuation model, equation (28), the weights attached to book values, earnings and dividends result from the interaction between the persistence of abnormal earnings, and our conservative adjustment. Since our primary concern is to test empirically the validity of our adjustments to the Ohlson model for conservatism, we do this by controlling for the variation in persistence. Our revised formulation as in equation (28) gives rise to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis:
The weights attached to book values and earnings in a regression of market values on book values, earnings and dividends are increasing functions of the degree of conservatism for a given level of persistence of abnormal earnings, while the corresponding weight attached to dividends is a decreasing function of conservatism.
In order to test the hypothesis, we first estimate the valuation weights and the parameters of the information dynamics as a time series following Myers (1999) who suggests that the parameters should reflect firms' economic environment, production technology and accounting policies. To control for the variation in persistence, we carry out a two-way analysis of the data by classifying the 16 Our main results are similar when we use a cost of capital of 9% and 15% in our analysis.
data into a 25 portfolios based on quintiles of the persistence of abnormal earnings and of conservatism. Although income in this theoretical model, is supposedly comprehensive income, as in prior literature (for example, Dechow et al. (1999) ), 17 we test the model by using reported earnings as a proxy of comprehensive earnings. The persistence parameter ( ) ω is calculated using equation (1) for all firms with at least 10 observations, while consistent with the theory developed in equation (33) the long run price-to-book ,
∑ ∑ is used as the measure conservatism χ (Bernard and Durlauf (1996) In Table 2 , we show the results of this two-way classification. We notice that within the same persistence quintile, the coefficients of book value are monotonically increasing in the quintiles of conservatism. In the case of reported earnings, strict monotonicity is observed in the second and third quintiles while there are only minor violations to monotonicity in the remaining quintiles 19 . For the coefficients of book value and earnings, we observe strict monotonicity in conservatism in their averages.
However turning to dividends, we find very little evidence of monotonicity, except perhaps 17 This may violate the clean surplus accounting assumption. However it eliminates potentially confounding effects of one-time items. We use reported earnings as a proxy, not only because dirty surplus accounting is not a first order concern, but empirical evidence also shows that the residual income valuation model is robust to dirty surplus earnings (Isidro et al. (2006) and Heinrichs et al. (2013) ). 18 The results (not reported here) are very similar when we use mean P/B or median P/B as the measure of conservatism. Note that there is no commonly accepted measure of accounting conservatism. For example, with respect to the recently developed C-score in Khan and Watts (2009) , Ashton and Wang (2013) argue that C-score 'is really a measure of propensity to follow a conservative accounting policy.' 19 Our results appear to contradict those of Chen et al. (2014) . Although they agree that pricing multiples are affected by both persistence of earnings and conservatism, with conservative firms having a greater degree of persistence in earning, they do not model and test the interaction between the persistence of earnings and conservatism. A glance at Table 2 shows that persistence plays a greater role in determing the earnings weights than conservatism.
in the average values of dividends. Even here strict monotonicity is observed only in the case of the average value of the conservatism parameter. Of more concern is that the theory of Ohlson (1995) predicts negative values for this coefficient and our adjustments do not change the predicted sign.
This puzzle of the positive sign of dividends in residual income valuation models is well documented in the literature and remains unresolved (Rees (1997) , Hand and Landsman (2005) ). It would appear to be a problem intrinsic to the formulation of the Ohlson (1995) model, rather than a problem attributable to our modification of the model for conservatism.
20
Our two-way classification lends itself to further testing of the Ohlson (1995) model and a more rigorous test of our adjustments for conservatism to the model. Table 3 [ ] 
These theoretical averages are shown in Table 3 and Figure 2 compares the theoretical values with the corresponding observed values. If we consider only the slopes or trends, we see that both in the case of persistence and of conservatism reasonable agreement between theory and observed occurs. This observation of the trend is supported by a consideration of the coefficient of correlation between theory and observed values. The correlations between the theoretical 21 and observed values in the case of the χ -quintiles is in excess of 0.89 for both book values and earnings, suggesting that our adjustments for conservatism are substantially correct. It is somewhat lower in the case of the persistence measure, the ω -quintiles, with the correlation between the theoretical and observed values being 0.58 for reported earnings. However the observed coefficient of, or weight attached, to book values is lower than theory predicts; a result first observed and discussed by Dechow et al. (1999) . However Dechow et al. (1999) report that the unadjusted Ohlson (1995) model results in a theoretical value 3 times that observed. In our adjusted model the theoretical value is just 1.22 times the observed value. The average value for reported earnings across all quintiles is 2.13 compared with a theoretical average of 2.17. Table 3 
< Insert
Conclusion
In this paper, we establish a formal relationship between the unbiased and unobservable accounting system posited by Ohlson (1995) and reported systems distorted by the principle of conservatism. We develop a methodology based on stochastic difference equations to analyse several apparently distinct forms of conservatism: the unconditional conservatism of accelerated depreciation combined with historical cost accounting in an inflationary environment, plus the conditional conservatism associated with income recognition and income smoothing. We find that all these specific examples assume a common analytical structure for the relationship between prices, book values, earnings and dividends. We establish the generality of these findings and argue that within a valuation framework unconditional and conditional conservatism are indistinguishable in their 21 In this exercise we set the cost of capital at 12% , 1.12 R = . However, we find that the value of R is not crucial and results based on costs of capital of 9% and 15% are very similar. impact. Our generalisation enables us to identify a summary theoretical measure of conservatism, which we are able to equate to the long-run ratio of price-to-book. Our theoretical analysis also offers an explanation of the hitherto anomalous result in the empirical literature of undervaluation in simple residual income valuation models and the failure to detect conservatism in the linear information dynamics. Our empirical evidence accords well with the theory developed.
The importance of this study carries messages for practitioners and academics. The first of these is that while it may be convenient in the academic literature and professional literature to talk about conditional and unconditional conservatism as different phenomena, they have the same common origin of a desire to be cautious in the recognition of increases in economic wealth. Hence the two manifest themselves in the statements of the financial positon in the same way, with reported book values lagging prices. This view that conservatism is essentially a timing issue is also echoed in the recent P D Leake ICAEW Lecture (Barker 2014) in which he argues that such a definition is general and no distinction is made between the different sources of conservatism.
Secondly, our revised valuation model is effectively a theoretical cross sectional asset pricing model, using reported data. The implication of our analysis is that the coefficients in such cross-sectional regressions depend on both the degree of accounting conservatism and the persistence of abnormal earnings. Thus any grouping that explores empirically or employs such coefficients needs to ensure homogeneity in these two aspects, whether an industry classification, as typically adopted in this literature, is sufficient is a moot point. This observation may offer a partial explanation of the relatively 'noisy' results that emerge in such empirical investigations to determine the cost of equity capital and their abandonment in favour of residual income models of the sort discussed in this paper.
APPENDIX A
Proofs of equations (5)-(8):
Since 1 1
(1 ) (
Hence, we have
For a relatively large t, as in general empirical investigations dealing with established firms, and with 0< α ≤1, the terms 1 0 1 (6) 
Hence the valuation equation (2) becomes
where (18) 
Proofs of equations
λ λ′∈ , for a large t, , t t δ δ′ can be modeled by:
We have: 
Under the assumption that long-run growth is positive ensuring that 0 0 , b b′ are insignificant compared with , t t b b′, we have:
Proof of equation (32):
Since (1 ) ( 1) [ | ] (1 )
The above can be written as
Applying the clean surplus relation:
( 1) (1 )
[ ] The figure shows values plotted against the conservative parameter χ . On the left hand axis, the book-to-market and the ratio of the valuation-to-price, where the valuation is computed using conservative accounting data and assuming the Ohlson (1995) The theoretical values for book are calculated from the formula:
[ ]
summed over i or j as appropriate. Panel A of Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for sample firm-year between 1976 and 2010. Firms in the extreme percentiles are deleted. Only stocks with price > $1 are included. The mean, standard deviation (stdev), 1% and 99%, median and first (Q1) and third (Q3) quartiles are reported. Price and dividends are respectively adjusted price per share and dividend per share. BPS and EPS are respectively book value per share and earnings per share based on adjusted number of shares. Earnings are net income per share before extraordinary items. P/B is the price-to-book ratio. Forward earnings yield (E/P) is net income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged market value of equity. Return on equity (ROE) is net income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged book value.
Panel B of Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for final sample, where all firms have at least 10 observations and persistence of abnormal earnings satisfies 0 1 ω < ≤ . Table 2 reports the coefficients of book value, earnings and dividends. We first run regression on Ohlson (1995) 
